The question of how effective EU's external governance is cannot be answered without looking at the broader geographical and historical framework in which the Union extends its influence. We argue that interdependence between Ukraine and Russia in several key aspects shapes the context within which the EU and Russia compete to export their policies.
Introduction
External governance, as elaborated earlier in this volume, is a way for the European Union (EU) to extend a common system of rules beyond its legal and geographical borders (Lavenex, 2004, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig in this volume). In this paper we argue that the question of how effective EU's external governance is cannot be answered without looking at the broader geographical and historical framework in which the EU extends its influence. Ukraine, a state with ambitions to join the EU, a close neighbor of Russia, is a suitable test case to address the question how EU's external governance is affected by other powers.
We conceptualize external governance as a way for the EU and neighbouring countries to cope with interdependence. The EU's external governance, especially when it involves institutionalized frameworks for political dialogue, networks or non-state actors, contrasts to Russia's traditional politics of power, aiming to re-establish Russia's influence over neighbouring states as a regional hegemon. Russia's policies are also sometimes embedded in the regional framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), created as a tool for coping with interdependence after the USSR disintegration. Russia's power, inside or outside the CIS, has the potential of interfering with EU's external governance and its ability to lead to policy transfer in several ways. First, by using existing institutional commitments in the CIS framework, its framework of bilateral agreements or other mechanisms of formal coordination. Second, by exercising power policies in areas, where interdependence (structural, geopolitical, economic) is high. The existence of such constraints has important implications, ranging from delineating a clear limit to what the EU can achieve in its neighbourhood policies to requiring internal EU policy adjustments to take into account Russia's presence, as for example with energy policy.
Even though external governance has been developed as a theoretical perspective that moves away from traditional geopolitical analyses, the different character of EU external governance does not eliminate the need to consider power. Given the fact that Russia, as a centre of power, poses very considerable constraints for EU external governance, we put interdependence 1 , the key variable determining Russia's power and ability to limit EU's policy extension, at the centre of our analysis. Rather than arguing, as the institutional model formulated by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) does, that the degree of existing institutionalization affects the success of external governance, we see interdependence as the driving force for institutionalization. For example, the EU started formulating an energy strategy and institutionalizing a policy internally because it needs to deal with energy dependence on Russia and transit dependence on Ukraine. In such cases, EU institutional rules appear to be the effect, rather than the cause of developments in the foreign policy arena.
Therefore, we argue, in line with the power model formulated by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) that interdependence with Russia is a key variable defining the effectiveness of EU's external governance.
Based on an analysis of the institutional rules underpinning EU's external governance as well as several sectoral analyses, we argue that the effectiveness of external governance in terms of rule selection, adoption and implementation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, in this volume) varies with the patterns of interdependence. We suggest that different kinds of interdependence between Ukraine and Russia -legacy-driven, structural/ institutional, geo-political or finally, economic interdependence -define the context within which the EU and Russia compete to export their policies and rules.
Before we analyse how EU external governance and Russia's power interact in different policy areas in Ukraine, we first outline the existing system of institutional and legal rules that make the formal foundation of EU or CIS governance. Next, we examine rule adoption driven by the EU's external governance in three different policy areas, namely 'deep trade', energy, and foreign and security policy. The levels of interdependence between Russia and Ukraine in these policy areas vary from low to high.
Based on this variation, we show that different patterns of interdependence with third states can present different level of constraints to EU rule transfer.
Comparing institutional underpinnings of governance 2

EU -Ukraine institutional and legal relations
The interactions between the EU and Ukraine have been so far defined by EU's reluctance to acknowledge Ukraine as a full-fledged candidate for membership. The possibility of enlargement remains, however, a crucial feature that characterizes EU-Ukraine relations. The reason why this is important is that, just as it was in the early phases of the EU's enlargement to the East, the Union's ability to govern (externally) is derived from the prospect of membership (Friis, 1998:6) . This prospect introduces in EUUkraine relations the asymmetry that we know from accession negotiations.
Since the EU has not made the Ukraine an official candidate, many of the tools and instruments that express the power asymmetry such as Accession partnerships cannot be used. The existing tools and institutional arrangements that underpin external governance, for example the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), bear the imprint of the power asymmetry and indicate the predominance of the hierarchal mode of governance defined in this volume. Through these institutions, the EU exercises its power in a technocratic, low key mode, yet the asymmetry remains and can be seen in the elements of conditionality existing in all institutional agreements and instruments.
The PCA between Ukraine and the EU was signed in June 1994 and entered into force in March 1998. From an institutional point of view, it creates several bilateral organs which, as with other EU agreements with third countries (and especially the EU's Association Agreements with Central and Eastern Europe), have the potential to take a life of their own in shaping the common regime. The institutions create conditions for EUUkraine political and expert dialogue. The provisions for structured meetings at different levels 3 , from leaders' summits to senior civil servants, parliamentarians and experts, provide for a possibility for network governance to develop.
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The PCA provides further for considerable projection of EU rules: 'The rules of the PCA introduce extensive, legally binding commitments with considerable implications for the domestic legislation of Ukraine' (European Commission). How binding these commitments are, however, varies between the specific provisions. The trade provisions of Title III are fairly precise and impose clear, enforceable obligations. Other provisions, e.g. in the area of labor cooperation, amount to no more than 'best endeavour' clauses and compliance with these depends on the overall disciplinary framework of the PCA.
It is important to note that the approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU is among the main priorities and determinant features of the PCA regime. Article 51 contains a list of areas which are to be included in the approximation process. As formulated, the article provides for a voluntary endeavor on the part of Ukraine to make its legislation compatible with the EU. Thus, it stops short of a 'hard' obligation for adoption of the acquis, which would materialize should Ukraine become an official candidate for membership.
The PCA does not contain any references to membership and neither does it have provisions suggesting pre-accession conditionality. It does, nevertheless, contain conditionality. In particular, Article 2 of the PCA defines respect for the principles of market economy as an essential element of the EU-Ukraine partnership. The consensus is that when Article 2 is read The development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU added a new dimension to the partnership relations with Ukraine. It is, however, primarily a set of institutional, legal and policy arrangements that respond to the EU citizens' desire for 'prosperity, security and stability' (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006) . The ENP has also been aptly characterized as an adaptation of enlargement policies to the foreign policy domain (Kelley, 2006: 29) . It relies on the legal and institutional structure of the PCA. The central instrument of this policy towards the Ukraine -the Action Plan (AP) of 2005, is a 'soft law' document, adopted as a Recommendation of the PCA Cooperation Council (Cremona and Hillion, 2006) . While denying membership, the AP seeks to strengthen the positive aspects of conditionality by promising enhanced economic integration, or a 'stake in the internal market', 5 and a set of rewards. It envisages clear benchmarks in the political and economic sphere which would trigger deepening of the relationship. Alongside these concrete steps, the AP arguably also strengthens the 'values' conditionality of the PCA, as progress is dependent on the adoption of the 'shared values' at the core of the ENP.
The AP contains the promise of a new Neighborhood Agreement to supplement the existing framework, which would provide for 'new entitlements and obligations' (Action Plan). There is currently a great deal of expectation and discussion regarding the nature, contents and legal basis of this agreement (Hillion, 2007 , Shapovalova, 2008 , Sushko et al, 2008 . Even though it has still some way to go, some key elements are already clear.
Deep trade provisions would be central. The core of the agreement would define areas of cooperation as the main dimensions of the external governance projected towards the Ukraine.
Clearly, domestic Ukrainian institutions and politics are also a key variable determining the success of conditionality and external governance as a whole. There are, however, other rules and agreements which play a role in Ukraine's case -these of the CIS.
Ukraine -CIS/SES/Russia relations
The CIS is a regional integration structure that seems, at first sight, to serve a similar function as the EU and other regional integration bodies, namely, to help its members deal with interdependence. Previous analyses, however, show that CIS does not provide 'hard law' constraints to its members' actions and does not require irreversible commitment from them.
It can be identified as a 'soft' regime remaining short of inducing formal compliance in the countries which have signed up to it (Dragneva, 2004 ). Yet despite serious institutional weaknesses of the CIS and the ambivalence of Ukraine's position within it (Dragneva and Dimitrova, 2007) , the CIS remains an important reference in Ukraine's international relations.
Ukraine is represented in most of the common institutions of the CIS. It has made a maximum use of the flexibility of the organization's institutions in order to minimize any loss of sovereignty. Yet, Ukraine continues to be a regular party to the structured political dialogue taking place at the various CIS meetings. Even in cases when Ukraine has eventually decided not to sign a certain CIS decision or agreement, it has frequently taken part in the process of its preparation.
In addition to structured political dialogue, a key function of the organs of the CIS is to serve as a medium for cooperation in areas of common interest through the conclusion of international agreements. Cooperation within the CIS is structured through a multiplicity of international agreements -multilateral and bilateral. Thus, the undertaking of any commitments and the extension of any common rules remains firmly within the sphere of international law.
In its range of areas for cooperation, the CIS can be described as a 'broad house'. Some areas can be characterized by greater intensity of cooperation and efforts to build a multilateral framework, such as trade (Dragneva and De Kort, 2007 ). Yet, the international regime in most of them can be characterized as particularly loose and soft. Even when Ukraine has chosen to sign certain agreements, it has frequently used various devices to mitigate the legal effects of the commitments made in them, such as reservations, general or vague provisions, delayed ratification (Dragneva, 2004) . The CIS is also known for its 'spaghetti bowl' of agreements, leading to conflict of rules, uncertainty and lack of coherence (Freinkman et al., 2004) .
Importantly, Ukraine's position in the CIS institutional framework is subject to weaker disciplines or sanctions. It has chosen not to participate in the CIS Economic Court set up in 1992. The 1994 Free Trade Agreement, signed by Ukraine, envisaged a dispute resolution sequence of measures including resort to the Economic Court. Yet, such a provision is more the exception rather than the rule and Ukraine has not been involved in a dispute brought before that Court.
Given the specific institutional features of the CIS regime, its effectiveness ultimately depends on Ukraine's will to be bound by it. Thus this regime does not amount to a legal constraint to EU's external governance. The level of Ukraine's involvement in the CIS arrangements, however, can be changed and is potentially subject to influence from Russia.
When discussing possible constraints for EU's external governance, it is important to refer also to one of the sub-regional organizations created within the post-Soviet space, that of the Single Economic Space (SES). This formation causes some concerns in view of the compatibility of the commitments undertaken by Ukraine and those undertaken towards the EU, which mostly stem from the institutional structure of the SES. Importantly, Despite the fact that Ukraine has defined its interest in SES primarily in terms of free trade -it is clear that the SES is another forum for high-level dialogue. The initial expectation that Ukraine will be formally pulling out of it did not materialize; on the contrary, there have been indications of plans to play an active role in shaping it (Timoshenko, 2005 , Terekhin, 2005 . 6 The overview of the EU's external governance as projected through the PCA and ENP versus the CIS/SES suggests that the EU is clearly more advanced in using institutions to structure governance and to project policies. This does not mean, however, that Russia's role can be neglected.
Interdependence in specific areas creates a crucial opening for Russia to exercise power in a more traditional sense, even if it does not channel it through CIS institutions. In the following sections, we start by examining a sectoral area with receding interdependence, namely trade. We proceed to look at an area where arguably more interdependence exists (foreign policy) and finally analyze an area which is a textbook case of high interdependence between Russia and the Ukraine: energy. We seek to show that EU's ability to influence policies and transfer its own rules is constrained by Russia's power in cases where interdependence is high. In cases when interdependence is lower, the EU appears to be more successful in projecting its rules.
Policy regimes: Trade
Ukraine -EU
Given the EU's core competences in trade and economic integration, trade is a policy area where we have seen sustained EU efforts to extend its The contents of the EU-Ukraine regime has been discussed at greater length elsewhere (Dragneva and Dimitrova 2007, World Bank, 2004 ). An important feature of this regime is the progressive liberalization and Thus, clearly, in trade the EU has a comprehensive rule transfer agenda, strengthened by the WTO context. Yet, the EU has also had to take into account the trade relations of the Ukraine and Russia/CIS and the extent to which the CIS has represented a competing provider of rules and policy export.
Ukraine -CIS/SES/Russia
Within the Soviet Union, Ukraine was part of a single market and all trade was in effect domestic trade. The break-up of the Union saw the rapid disintegration of this economic system, which the new independent states sought to contain through the CIS. They also embarked on a new course of reintegration largely driven by and centered around Russia (Dragneva, 2004, Dragneva and De Kort, 2007) . It is important to note the extent of this reintegration in the area of trade and the degree to which it can restrain EU external governance.
Ukraine operates a free trade regime with the CIS based on a complex set of bilateral and selective multilateral engagements (Dragneva and De Kort, 2007, Dragneva and Dimitrova, 2007) . This regime does not cover all trade in the sense that it allows for exemptions to be negotiated in separate protocols. 8 The trade regime, despite its evolution through the years, can be described more as a 'simple' rather than a 'deep' free trade, characterized by a weak institutional basis (Dragneva and De Kort, 2007) . The CIS regime entails some level of harmonization particularly in the area of customs legislation and administrative practice. Another key area, largely reflecting inherited interdependencies, is that of technical standards.
CIS Member States inherited the USSR system of standards (GOST) which was not recognized in the rest of the world. For example, one of the early multilateral CIS agreements provides for the recognition of the USSR standards as international standards for the CIS countries. The agreement also provided for policy coordination in standardization, metrology and certification through the special Intergovernmental Council (Dragneva and De Kort, 2007) .
This regime, however, has failed to contribute to significant levels of trade reintegration. As Table 1 shows, trade decline has continued. There are many reasons for this, yet it has been argued that it is due to a large extent to the institutional and legal weaknesses of the regime (Freinkman et al, 2004) .
Administrative and other non-tariff barriers between CIS members continue to exist as a result of failed domestic reforms and low quality of governance and remain a crucial factor limiting trade.
Receding Interdependence in Trade and Few Constraints to EU Governance
In general, there are four reasons why Ukraine -CIS/Russia trade relations, as described above, do not represent a major competing centre to the EU. First, as explained above, the CIS is a weak, simple trade area. While current arrangements do not constrain the Ukraine in EU rule selection and adoption at present, a potential future deepening of the economic integration agenda within the CIS or SES would create incompatibilities , Cremona, 2004 . 10 Such a deepening seems unlikely in the CIS, despite the fact that initially free trade was conceived as a first stage in the progressive achievement of an economic union. It remains a possibility, however, within the SES, which refers, in its founding documents, to the creation of an economic union. If Ukraine were to enter into a customs union with its SES partners (or another CIS constellation), it would be the union's institutions, not Ukraine that would renegotiate current (or pending) free trade arrangements with the EU, and vice versa, in the case of membership into the EU. Thus, participation in both an EU and a SES customs union would be impossible.
Importantly, the move to a 'deep trade plus' arrangements with the EU in the context of the New Enhance Agreement raises the level of commitment in terms of adopting various aspects of the EU acquis. Given the growing emphasis on regulatory harmonization, key aspects of Ukraine-CIS relations, such as the issue of technical standards mentioned above, assume even greater importance and constrain EU governance by affecting rule adoption and implementation. Given the benefits for the EU from continued free trade relations in the region, it has been argued that 'it would be desirable for Ukraine's CIS partners to also persuade their institutions to approximate to EU norms, rather than maintain idiosyncratic rules' (Emerson et al., 2006: 63) .
Thus, in the area of trade, the EU external governance has been growing and effective in transferring the EU's (and WTO) rules. We see this in correlation with Ukraine's diminishing dependence on trade with Russia and the CIS. Significant trade reorientation has taken place and the share of 20 CIS trade has decreased significantly (see Table 1 ). Yet, some economic and geographical interdependence between Ukraine, Russia and CIS remains.
Russia is a key trade partner of Ukraine, particularly in the area of energy imports, as will be discussed below. There are important institutional legacies, such as in the area of standards, which will still affect EU rule adoption and implementation.
The next policy area, foreign policy, is one in which interdependence stems from important historical legacies and geographical proximity and constrains the EU's efforts to promote Ukraine's adoption of its foreign policy and addressing its security concerns.
Policy regimes: Foreign and security policy
Ukraine -EU
In contrast to the PCA, in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy Wolczuk notes that it joined some only under extreme energy supplies related pressure by Russia .
More important than these institutional arrangements has been The practical implementation of this issue, however, was tied up in the Ukrainian 2008 budget law with the Ukrainian debt to Russia of 1.3 billion USD for gas (Silina, 2008) . This example illustrates the complex interdependences not only within one policy sector, but also between sectors.
Interdependence with Russia remains an important factor in policy choice
On the whole, we can conclude that EU governance has been effective in policy transfer. Yet, in important areas driven by historical legacies and geopolitical interdependence, policy alignment and policy implementation have been significantly constrained. The non-alignment of the Ukraine with the EU's common position on Belarus, mentioned above, shows the country's response to regional interdependence despite its general decision to follow the EU's lead. Ukraine has declared that it shares the EU's views on the political regime in Belarus, but has consistently tried to mediate in a dialogue with Belarus, including high level meetings (Melyantsou and Kazakevich, 2008:70) .
Importantly, the EU's ability to export its governance in foreign relations is also constrained by the resurging idea of Russia as a regional power and corresponding Russian policies, including violence. Analysts have pointed out that after 2003 and especially after Ukraine's 'Orange revolution', Russia has abandoned the idea of CIS as a liberal trade community and has embraced the idea of its regional power status instead (Krastev, 2005) . During Putin's second presidency, there has been a consistent effort in reasserting Russia's traditional sphere of influence (Jonson, 2004 , Vinokurov, 2007 , Godzimirski, 2007 . Thus, we find evidence that interdependence with Russia in foreign policy has constrained EU external governance -partly in policy adoption and significantly in actual policy implementation. Yet the area where constraints stemming from interdependence are most visible is not foreign policy but energy.
Policy regimes: Energy
Ukraine-EU
Energy has been one of the priority areas of ENP since the beginning. It aims to enable integration with the European energy market, but also to 'help the countries concerned come in line with European standards and norms' (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006 ). Ukraine's integration into EU's energy market as a part of a deep trade arrangement requires the adoption of a set of regulatory standards.
The Ukraine is highly important for the EU as a transit country for gas coming from Russia. As an indication of this importance and of overall interdependence, 76% of the Russian gas comes to the EU via Ukraine, 20.3%
is delivered via Belarus and 3.7% is delivered directly from Russia to More importantly, and particularly in the critical area of oil and gas, Russia has maintained bilateral relations, which have taken place at the highest levels of negotiation and in an atmosphere of secrecy (De Souza, 2008) . Further, intra-CIS trade has been plagued by non-transparent barter arrangements, discriminatory access to pipelines and corruption (Dodsworth et al. 2002 , Stern, 2005 . Energy interdependence has been explicitly used by Russia in the CIS context for political purposes (Godzimirski, 2007 , Razumkov centre, 2007b ). Russia's bilateral deals and contracts for gas deliveries with EU member states and Ukraine represent the best example of interdependence as a source of power which interferes with effective governance by the EU.
Gas and oil trade have become a traditional power arena, where states seek to capitalize on structural advantages. Russia has repeatedly used price and indirect taxation as a policy lever. It has exploited its monopoly over resources by limiting the supply of energy. This monopoly position is evident in relation to gas resources given that Russia supplies about 35% of Ukraine's consumption and controls the transit of other Ukrainian supplies (primarily from Turkmenistan) which amount to about 40% (De Souza, 2008) . Given the Russian ownership of gas pipelines and the complexities of Turkmen foreign policy, this is an extreme dependence on one source which is very difficult to diversify.
In the area of oil, about 75% of consumption of Ukrainian refineries comes from Russia. Another important part is delivered from Central Asia (primarily Kazakhstan), again through Russian routes (De Souza, 2008 . Ukraine has tried to increase its bargaining power by using its geographical position as a transit country, raising transit fees and imposing other transit conditions on Russia. Yet, it remains unable to break its dependence on Russia. 12 Interdependence patterns can be found also in business networks of actors in the energy field. Ukraine's energy related companies are often partly owned by Russian businesses and in need of restructuring. An example is Neftogaz, the Ukrainian gas company and the intermediary RosUkrEnergo. The latter has been sometimes described as a non-transparent network linked to those in power in both countries. There are several more non-transparent financial and industrial groups operating in the oil refining and coal mining sector, owned by Russian capital ). 13 Another example of structural interdependence is demonstrated by the electricity sector. Ukraine's grid (except for a small segment), remains connected to the CIS grid, which has different technical characteristics from the European grid ).
On the whole, existing interdependence within the CIS and with Russia -structural (technical), geographical and economic -constrains considerably EU policy transfer in the field.
Interdependence prompts institutionalization of new EU policies
In early Gasprom and Ukraine. This most recent gas crisis has made it clear to the EU that an energy policy of its own is the only way to tackle its own and Ukraine's dependence on Russian gas.
A truly common EU energy policy, engaging all the member states would make the EU position much stronger, but is resisted by Russia.
Commenting on the proposed clauses in the Commission's third energy liberalization package that would make bilateral energy deals an EU competence, a source in Russia's Economic and Trade Ministry stated that 'damage from such politicizing of investment issues will be reciprocal, but will hit the European Union more severely ' (Euractiv, 2008 In conclusion: constraints to the EU's external governance
The comparison of the three policy areas above reveals a pattern of constraints to the EU's external governance that increase when there is high interdependence with Russia/the CIS. We summarize our findings in Table   2 . In foreign and security policy, interdependence remains important despite the formal alignment of Ukraine with most EU statements and positions. In this area we find a clash of the EU's soft approach and Russia's politics of power that illuminates another important constraint to external governance. Russia's strongly defined, 19 th century concept of sovereignty not only clashes with EU norms in this area but leads to Russian actions which the EU is clearly powerless to counteract with external governance tools.
In energy, Ukraine's integration into EU's energy market as a part of a deep trade arrangement requires the adoption of a set of regulatory standards. In this area, CIS institutional arrangements are soft, but in spite of their weakness, the existing infrastructural interdependence and Russia's use of energy policy as a geopolitical tool (Lo, 2002) , clearly limit the scope for EU rule transfer.
Thus, we identify differences in the extent of interdependence with Russia: it is low and receding in trade; yet in energy it is high in view of Russia's monopoly position and control over infrastructure. We also find differences in the interdependence patterns across policy areas. Russia has used mostly institutional levers in trade and mostly power policies in energy and foreign policy to constrain rule/policy adoption and implementation.
Similarly, we see a differing depth of the effect on EU governance ranging from constraints of rule and policy selection (mostly in energy and FCSP) to primary effects on rule implementation (in trade).
These findings are in line with the power model defined by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) , which expects incentives and costs for domestic governments to be decisive in adoption of external rules. The current restrictions to the EU's effective governance posed by Russia's power may be diminished if the EU were to offer the Ukraine a genuine prospect for membership, as enlargement might change the cost benefit calculation of domestic actors and increase the EU's hierarchical power.
The notion of governance presupposes forms of organization that go beyond hard notions of external and internal sovereignty (Lavenex 2004: 682) . For contemporary Russia, however, the idea of sovereignty is at the center of its view of itself, its neighbours and the state system in Europe. The
Russian worldview may not include understanding of external governance as a projection of the EU's own multi level governance system. In the apt words of Krastev (2008) , the clash between EU and Russia is ultimately a clash between a post-modern state, embodied by the EU and the traditional modern state, embodied by Russia. In the Ukraine, more so than in any other part of the world, the successful spread of EU's external governance may end where a strong notion of traditional power reasserts itself.
